I.目錄 (略)
II.權威文件引述表 (略)
III.預先陳述和爭議摘要
在此上訴中,原告兼上訴人范似棟(後文稱「范」)尋求覆議該地區法院的裁決,該裁決同意被告美國政府的動議,駁回原告訴狀。
按照原告訴狀所述,范曾經於1982年訪問中國上海的美國領事館。 一個領事館官員告訴范,他關心領事館是否被中國人安裝了竊聽器,並要求范參與一個「假裝」的談會和假裝交給他一份中國「官方」文件,以測試他的懷疑是否正確。范不情願參加,但由於領事官員向范保證如果他被捕美國會出面幫他,所以范就不再理會這樣做中國會認為范和美國合作。范參與了「假裝」的談會,然後又假裝傳送「官方」的中國文件給領事官員。
范聲稱他很快就被捕了並被中國官方控告,罪名是向外國政府送交官方文件,1983年被判十二年入獄。范起訴時稱美國沒有向中國提交證據,以說明談話和傳交文件是假裝的和沒有違法。按照范的說法,如果美國向中國提交了這些證據,他不會被起訴,判刑和入獄。
范在訴狀中聲稱要求申請冤案補救法令。范這樣做表明他相信,由於美國沒有提供他無罪的證據,所以他在中國的判決時缺少正當合法程序。范還投訴他受到疏忽罪和欺騙罪的侵權。但是,范從來沒有遵照聯邦民事侵權賠償法(FTCA,美國法典28卷第2671節) 規定,在向法院投訴前向有關聯邦機構提起行政投訴。而且, 聯邦民事侵權賠償法(FTCA)特別禁止針對美國的欺騙指控。因此,他的侵權指控應該被地區法院駁回。
至於他的有關程序的訴求,范最終承認他的申請冤案賠償法令不適用於他的民事訴訟程序。因此,任何源於他1983年中國審判的有關法定訴訟程序的投訴,都因為六年的民事訴訟的時效(美國法典28卷第2401條(a))而被禁止,而他的投訴是2011年立案的。因此,該地區法院應該駁回他的所有指控。
IV.問題的提出
A. 地區法院是否因為缺乏事項審判權,對原告兼上訴人范似棟的投訴而給予確實駁回?
V.有關審判權的說明
這上訴針對美國華盛頓西部地區法院的終審裁定,該裁法同意批準被告美國的動議否決原告的訴求。(摘要6;文件27)【1】。根據美國法典28卷第1346節,美國地區法院對此案有審理權。
根據美國法典28卷第1291條,該地區法院對本案有審理權。該法院的終審裁定於2012年1月23日生效。2012年3月5日范在有效時間內提起上訴。(摘要1,文件30)。
VI.案件陳述
A. 范訴狀中的事實性陳述
裁定所批準同意的被告政府動議駁回了原告訴求,(摘要6-8;文件27),其中所述案件相關事實概述如下:
1982年,范訪問在中國上海的美國領事館,討論去美國留學的可能性和傳遞中國異議分子受到中國政府迫害的消息。(摘要7;文件27)。美國領事何大衛先生告訴范,他擔心領事館被中國人安裝了竊聽器,所以要求范參與一個「假裝」的談會和假裝交給他一份中國「官方」文件,以測試他的竊聽器懷疑是否正確。(摘要7;文件27)。范不情願參加,但由於領事官員向范保證如果他被捕美國會出面幫他,所以范不再理會這樣做中國會認為他和美國合作。(摘要7;文件27)。范參與了「假裝」的談會,然後又假裝傳送「官方」的中國文件給該領事官員。(摘要7;文件27)。
被告很快就被捕了並被中國官方控告,罪名是向外國政府送交官方文件,1983年被判十二年入獄,按范的說法,他被關在一個中國勞改營十二年。(摘要7;文件27)。他聲稱美國范提出訴求時稱美國沒有向中國提交證據說明談話和傳交文件是假裝的和不是非法的。按照范的說法,如果美國向中國提交了這些證據,他不會被起訴,判刑和入獄。他聲稱美國盡力營救他但卻沒有向中國提交會談和文件都是假裝的,因而不違法。(摘要7;文件27)。按范的說法, 如果美國向中國提交了這些證據,他不會被起訴,判刑和入獄。(摘要7;文件27)。
B. 范的投訴和美國政府要求駁回原告訴狀的動議
2011年范向美國華盛頓州西區地區法院起訴,尋求冤案補救法令以賠償他1983年在中國的刑事審判中因法定程序權利被侵犯而受到的損失,他還對美國的疏忽罪提出訴求。(摘要2)。2011年9月21日他第三次修改他的訴狀。(摘要3,16-36;文件13)。美國政府於10月5日提議駁回原告訴訟,基於以下理由:1)原告訴狀沒有說明有關冤案補償法令的訴求;2)由於范沒有按照聯邦民事侵權賠償法(FTCA)要求向適當的行政部門投訴所以地區法院對疏忽罪訴求沒有審理權。(摘要37-43;文件14)。
范以第四次訴狀修訂版回應政府的動議。(摘要45-57;文件23)。在他的回應中,范承認他沒有資格向法院申請冤案補償法令。(摘要45;文件23)。關於他的疏忽罪指控,范反駁說他在向法院起訴前曾就他在中國入獄一事向美國幾個總統寄過信。(摘要48;文件23)。他還爭辯說他直到2008年他才發現美國的疏忽罪,因此直到2008年,兩年時效才開始。(摘要56;文件23)。范增加了對被告的欺騙罪指控。(摘要53-56;文件23)。
2011年12月22日,美國政府對范的修改版訴狀作出回應。(摘要58;文件24)。美國政府爭辯稱范在1983年己認識到美國方面的疏忽,當時他被中國定罪,因此他的訴求應該在1983年成立,而不是根據「罪證發現原則」於2008年成立。(摘要59,文件24)。最後美國政府指出,不管怎樣,范從來沒有就疏忽罪或欺騙罪提出行政投訴,所以有關有關他所受損失的爭議沒有意義。(摘要60,文件24)。
C. 地區法院決定駁回原告訴求
2012年1月23日,地區法院批准同意美國政府有關駁回原告訴求的動議。(摘要6,文件27)。首先,該地區法院指出范承認他他沒有資格要求申請冤案補償法令,在此基礎上,駁回原告訴求中的這一要求。(摘要11,文件27)。
該地區法院也駁回范的疏忽罪指控。對此,該地區法院同意美國政府提出的范從來沒有以FTCA為目的向聯邦機構提出訴求,因此該地區法院對范的疏忽罪指控沒有管轄權。
所以即使按照原告的訴狀,相信原告曾經就他的中國入獄一事向美國總統寫過各種各樣的信,由於政府檔案裡的原告信件紀錄中沒有確定數額的賠償金要求,所以被告認為,原告從來沒有為了FTCA目的向適當的聯邦機構提出過疏忽罪訴求。(聯邦政府管理條例 28卷14.2節(a))。
(摘要12-13;文件27)。
該地區法院裁決原告向相關的聯邦機構作疏忽罪投訴的時間早已過去。
1983年,原告入獄時就已經清楚美國官員們沒有像他們所說的那樣提交為原告開脫罪責的證據,所以原告的訴求應該產生於他入獄的1983年。原告從那時開始有兩年時間向相關聯邦機構投訴。(美國法典28卷第2401節(b)款)。他的過失使得該法院無權管轄。
(摘要13,文件27)。
該地區法院也否決了范有關「罪證發現原則」的爭辯:
原告認為由於所謂的罪證發現原則,他的沒有及時提交疏忽罪的投訴可以被輍免,該但地區法院並不認同。原告特別爭辯說,既使他一直相信他的入獄是由於美國官員沒有提交為他開脫罪責的證據,直到2008年他的律師得到了有關他被捕的中國官方文件,他才掌握證據,證據表明他的定罪是因為那次和美國領事的「假裝」的談話。即使接受原告的說法,原告的疏忽罪指控仍然被拒絕,因為「一個FTCA訴求的成立,在於原告知道傷害的時候,或者一個通情達理的勤勉的人應該知道傷害和傷害的原因的時候,而不是拿到事故的證據的時候。(羅克斯可夫對舊金山市和縣,聯邦法律報告三系列535卷,1044,1050頁(第九上訴法院208年))(重點號已加)。
(摘要13-14,文件27)。
關於范提出的欺騙罪指控,該地區法院裁決認定,這項指控被否決,不僅因為這項指控沒有遵守行政部門的規定,而且也因為這項指控被美國法典28卷2680節所禁止。(摘要14,文件27)。最後,該地區法院裁決原告的其它指控訴求,包括法定程序權利被侵犯的指控訴求,以及已經被否決的申請冤案補償法令,都因美國法典28卷2401節(a)款所規定的民事訴訟的通常的六年時效的原因而被禁止。(摘要14-15, 文件27)。
VII.爭議
A. 該地區法院正確地駁回了原告訴訟
1. 基本回顧
根據聯邦關於民事訴訟程序的規定,重新回顧該地區法院由於缺乏事項管轄權而作出的駁回決定。(斯克諾伯兒 對 劉 聯邦法律報告 第三系列302卷1023,1029頁)(第九上訴法院2002年)。
2. 由於缺乏事項管轄權地區法院正確地駁回了原告訴訟
范沒有對他的申請冤案補償法令被否決表示異議。他對他的疏忽罪,欺騙罪和法定訴訟程序的訴求被駁回表示反對。參見上訴人非正式文件附加4部分,因此必須對該地區法院的裁決加以重申。
a. 由於缺乏事項管轄權而作出駁回決定的標準
按照聯邦關於民事訴訟程序第12條(b)(1)的規定,如果一個訴訟符合以下條件,則必須被駁回。考慮到原告的事實性陳述往往對原告有利,如果起訴:1.沒有憲法,法律和美國簽定的條約為根據,或者不屬於憲法第三章第二條的類似範圍;2.不是在憲法意義上的案件和爭議;3.不是在司法管轄權範圍內的問題。(貝克 對 卡,美國案例和準則,369卷186,198節, 也參見美國法典28卷1331頁)(聯邦問題初審權)和1346款,(作為被告的美國政府)。根據聯邦民事程序條例12條(b)(1),考慮一個動議是否否決時,法院不必受原告訴狀的限制,而應該考慮多方證據以解決有關管轄權的事實性爭議。(麦卡錫 對 美國, 聯邦案例報告 第二系列850卷558,560頁(第九上訴法院,1988年);生命學研究公司 對 赫克爾 聯邦案例報告第二系列710卷1375,1379(第九上訴法院,1983年))。
在原告證明聯邦法院有事項管轄權之前,可以假定聯邦法院缺乏事項管轄權。(西方股票公司 對 聯合部落 聯邦案例報告第二系列873卷,1221,1225頁(第9上訴法院,1989年))。因此原告承擔證明事項管轄權存在的最終責任。參見考克任 對 美國保護生命有限公司 美國案例和準則 511卷 375,377頁(1994))。當被告根據訴狀以外的證據對訴狀中有關管轄權的事實進行挑戰時,原告有責任證明事項管轄權,提供證據證書,這樣事項管轄權才切實存在。(聖克萊 對 切可市, 聯邦案例報告第二系列880卷199,201頁(第9上訴法院,1989年))。
b. 地區法院正確地否決了訴狀中的所有指控
在地區法院,范聲稱尋求申請冤案補償法令。(摘要23,文件13)。范這樣尋求這個法令是為了解決他所認為的由於美國沒有提供證據證明他的清白,使他在中國的審理沒有經過正當的法定程序。(摘要23-34;文件13)。范也聲稱美國政府的疏忽罪和欺騙罪造成了對他的侵權損害。(摘要50-53,文件23)。像他的法定程序權利受到侵犯一樣,范的疏忽罪指控也是源於美國政府沒有向中國政府提供證據,以證明美國領事何大衛的談話和傳交文件都是假裝的和沒有違犯法律。
除非投訴人事先爭取行政部門的賠償,還是沒有辦法解決,聯邦侵權賠償法才可以立案和提供美國國家賠償。(美國法典28卷 2875節(a),並參見 伯萊迪 訴 美國, 美國案例報告第三系列211卷499,502頁(第9上訴法院,2000年))。行政投訴要求原告在訴求成立的兩年內, 向相關聯邦機構提出訴求。(美國法典28卷2401節 (b) 款; 斯泰柏爾 訴 美國, 聯邦案例報告第二系列740卷766,768頁(第9上訴法院1984年))。這一有問題行政部門解決,輕易不使用聯邦民事侵權賠償法(FTCA)的要求關係到司法管轄權,必須堅決照辦,因為聯邦民事侵權賠償法放棄國家主權輍免權,由於這樣的放棄所以必須在其它方面盡可能照顧美國的利益。參見柏萊迪, 聯邦案例報告第三系列211卷501頁 (引自傑弗斯 訴 美國, 聯邦案例報告第二系列966卷517,521頁(第9上訴法院.1992年))。所以如果沒有向相關行政機構作行政投訴,地區法院沒有審理案件的管轄權,所以由於沒有管轄權駁回訴訟是必然的。參見 柏萊迪 訴 美國, 聯邦案例報告第三系列211卷499,502~503頁()第9上訴法院.2000年)。
這裡,該地區法院正確地發現范從來沒有向任何聯邦機構作行政投訴。(摘要12-13;文件27)。正如法院著重提出的,沒有紀錄表明范像聯邦注冊委員會28卷14.2節(a)款所要求的給各位總統的信件附有具體金額的賠償金。(摘要12-13;文件27)。而且該地區法院還進一步發現行政投訴早已過了而且無法補救。正如該法院著重指出的,原告在1983年入獄,因此在兩年的有效期內,原告可以提出聯邦民事侵權名義的任何訴訟。(美國法典28卷2401節 (b))。作為疏忽罪指控的限期是1985年,和范投訴的2011年相比早很多年。(摘要13;文件27)。就這一點而言, 即使范給各位總統的信件滿足了聯邦民事侵權賠償法(FTCA)竭盡全力的條件,看來這些信件中的第一封是2009年才發出的。參見上訴人的非正式文件第三份文件。
該地區法院也正確地否決了范的「罪證發現原則」的爭議。正像該法院指出的那樣,「一個聯邦民事侵權賠償法(FTCA)訴求的成立,在於原告知道傷害的時候,或者一個通情達理的勤勉的人應該知道傷害和傷害的原因的時候,而不是拿到事故的證據的時候。(羅克斯可夫 訴 舊金山市和縣,聯邦案例報告第三系列535卷,1044,1050頁(第9上訴法院208年))(重點號已加)。(摘要13-14;文件27)。最後,是關於范的欺騙罪指控,該地區法院指出,這個對美國的指控不合適。(摘要14;文件27)。無疑范的這一指控是因為歪曲誤傳。比如,在聯邦民事侵權賠償法中特別排除欺騙罪。(美國法典28卷2680節(h));也參見奧維希牧場協會公司 訴 費爾德, 聯邦案例報告第二系列694,697頁(第9上訴法院,1981年)。
這些文字和結論毫不含糊地寫在聯邦民事侵權法中。因此范不能證明該地區法院把他的疏忽罪和欺騙罪指控駁回有什麼錯。
該地區法院也正確地裁決范其它的訴求,包括任何申請冤案補救法令的法定程序權利被侵犯的訴求,被美國法典28卷2401(a)民事訴訟法6年時效所禁止。值得懷疑的是一個憲法意義上的侵權行為是否可以構成對美國的訴訟。【2】我們假設,范在他被審判的1983年已經意識到美國沒有向中國提供他的無罪證明。這是他的合法程序權利被侵犯的訴求的事實基礎。因此,訴求於1983年成立。所以可行的合法的程序時效算至1989年。范無法證明該地區法院駁回他的訴求有什麼錯,這些訴求聽起來不像習慣法的侵權行為。
VIII. CONCLUSION 結論
根據以上說明的理由,該地局法院同意美國的動議駁回原告訴求必須得到肯定。
日期2012年9月10日。
吉妮 A. 德坎
美國律師
華盛頓州西部地區
注解1.「摘要(SER)」即被告補充和摘要的紀錄。「文件(CR)」即美國地區法院案件紀錄編號。原告檔案沒有在摘要中存放。
注解2.憲法意義的對侵權行為的訴訟不是聯邦民事侵權賠償法可以審理的。傅迪克 訴 迈爾斯, 美國最高法院案例 510卷471,478頁(1994年)),也不可直接以畢文案的方式對美國起訴。(卡妥 訴 美國 聯邦案例報告三集70卷1103,1110頁(第9上訴法院 1995年))。還有,雖然特克爾法令允許一定的憲法訴訟可以直接針對美國,參見美國法典28卷1491(a)(1)。但這不包括憲法意義的侵權行為訴訟。參見布朗 訴 美國 聯邦案例報告第三系列105卷621,623-24頁(聯邦上訴法院1997年)。即使這些問題都不存,由於范尋求超過1萬美金的賠償金,(摘要34-35),這樣的訴求必須由特殊管轄權的聯邦賠償法院審理,而不是由地區法院。(參見美國法典28卷1346節(a)(2),1491節(a)(1))。
ANSWERING BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
I.TABLE OF CONTENTS (OMITTED)
II.TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (OMITTED)
III.PRELIMINARY STATEMENT AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In this appeal, Plaintiff-Appellant Stone Dong Fan (“Fan”) seeks review of the district court’s order granting the government’s motion to dismiss.
According to his complaint, Fan visited the United States Consulate in Shanghai, China, in 1982. Fan was told by a consular official that he was concerned that the consulate was “bugged” by the Chinese and asked Fan to engage in a “sham” conversation, and pretend to pass him an “official” Chinese document, to test whether his bugging suspicion was correct. Fan reluctantly agreed to participate, despite concerns that the Chinese would think he was really cooperating with the United States, because the consular official assured him that the United States would come to his assistance if he was arrested. Fan engaged in the “sham” conversation and pretended to pass an “official” Chinese document to the consular official.
Fan alleges that he was promptly arrested by Chinese authorities charged with the crime of passing an official document to a foreign government, and upon conviction in 1983 was imprisoned for 12 years. Fan claims that the United States never presented the Chinese with evidence that the conversation and transfer of the document were shams and not illegal. According to Fan, had the United States presented such evidence to the Chinese, he would not have been prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned.
Fan’s complaint asserted entitlement to writ of Coram Nobis. Fan sought such a writ to address what he believes was a lack of due process at his trial in China, stemming from the United States’ failure to introduce evidence of his innocence. Fan also asserted tort claims of negligence and fraud. However, Fan never presented an administrative claim to the appropriate federal agency prior to filing suit, as required by the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C §2671, et seq. (“FTCA”). Furthermore, the FTCA specifically forbids claims for fraud against the United States. Therefore, his tort claims were properly dismissed by the district court.
As for his due process claim, Fan eventually conceded that a writ of Coram Nobis was not available to him in this civil proceeding. Furthermore, any due process claim stemming from his trial in China arose in 1983 and, therefore, was barred at the time the action below was filed in 2011 by the general six-year statute of limitations for civil claims found in 28 U.S.C. §2401(a). Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed all of the claims before it.
IV.ISSUE PRESENTED
A Did the district court properly dismiss the complaint where it clearly lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of all claims stated therein by Plaintiff-Appellant Stone Dong Fan?
V.STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final order issued by the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granting the United States’ Motion to Dismiss. Ser6; CR 27.【1】The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1346.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291. The district court’s order was entered on January 23, 2012. SER3. On March 5, 2012 Fan timely appealed. SER 1; CR 30.
VI.STATEMNET OF THE CASE
A. The Factual Allegations of Fan’s Complaint.
The relevant factual allegations, which are set forth in the Order granting the government’s motion to dismiss, SER 6-8; CR27, can be summarized as follows:
In 1982, Fan visited the United States Consulate in Shanghai, China, to discuss the possibility of studying in the United States and to relay information to United States officials regarding the suppression of dissent by the Chinese government. SER 7; CR 27. The United States Consul, David Hess, told Fan that he was concerned that the consulate was “bugged” by the Chinese and asked Fan to engage in a “sham” conversation, and pretended to pass him an “official” Chinese document, to test whether his bugging suspicion was correct. SER 7; CR 27. Fan reluctantly agreed to participate, despite concerns that the Chinese would think he was really cooperating with the United States, after Hess assured his that the United States would come to his assistance if he was arrested. SER 7; CR 27. Thereafter, Fan engaged in the “sham” conversation with Hess and pretended to pass an “official” Chinese document to him. SER 7; CR 27.
Plaintiff was promptly arrested by Chinese authorities and charged with the crime of passing an official document to a foreign government. SER 7; CR27. He was convicted in 1983 and , according to Fan, was imprisoned for 12 years in a Chinese labor camp. SER 7; CR 27. He claims that the United States did its best to try and rescue him but that the United States never presented the Chinese with evidence that the conversation and transfer of the document were shams and not illegal. SER 7; CR 27. According to Fan, had the United States presented such evidence to the Chinese, he would not have been prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned. SER 7; CR 27.
B. Fan’s complaint and the Government’s Motion to Dismiss.
In 2011, Fan filed a complaint in United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, seeking a writ of Coram nobis to remedy alleged procedural due process violations that occurred in his Chinese criminal trial in 1983, and also alleging negligent inaction on the part of the United States. SER 2. He amended his complaint for the third time on September 21, 2011. SER 3, 16-36; CR 13. The government moved to dismiss the complaint on October 5, 2011, on the grounds that: 1) the complaint failed to state a claim for a writ of Coram nobis; and 2)the district court lacked jurisdiction over the negligence claims because Fan had failed to file an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency before filing suit as required by the FTCA. SER 37-43; CR 14.
Fan responded to the government’s motion with what was essentially a fourth amended complaint. SER45-57; CR 23. In his response, Fan conceded that he was not entitled to a writ of Coram nobis. SER 45; CR 23. In regards to his negligence claims, Fan countered that he had mailed various letters to various United States Presidents prior to filing suit concerning his imprisonment by the Chinese. SER 48; CR 23. He also argued that it was not until 2008 that he discovered the United States’ negligence and that his claims, therefore, did not accrue until 2008 for purposes f the applicable two-year stature of limitations. SER 56; CR23. Fan also added a claim of fraud to his original claims. SER 53-56; CR23.
The government filed a reply to Fan’s response/amended complaint on December 22,2011. SER58; CR 24. The government argued Fan was aware of any negligence on the part of the United States in 1983 when he was convicted by the Chinese government, and his claims therefore accrued in 1983, not in 2008 under the so-called “discovery rule.” SER 59; CR 24. Finally, the government noted that, regardless of tolling, Fan had never filed an administrative claim with respect to negligence or fraud and, therefore, the tolling argument was not relevant. SER 60; CR 24.
C. The District Court’s Decision Dismissing the Complaint.
On January 23, 2012, the district court granted the government’ motion to dismiss. SER 6; CR 27. First, the district noted that Fan had conceded that he was not entitled to a writ of Coram Nobis and, based upon that concession, dismissed the claim for such relief. SER 11; CR27.
The district court also dismissed Fan’s negligence claims. In doing so, the
district court agreed with the government that Fan had never presented a
claim to a federal agency for purposes of the FTCA and that the district
court, therefore, lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Fan’s negligence
claims:
As such, even when crediting Plaintiff’s claim that he sent various letters to the President regarding his Chinese imprisonment, Plaintiff’s claim of negligence was never “presented to an appropriate federal agency for purposes of the FTCA since there is nothing in the record of suggest that those letters were “accompanied by a claim for money damages in a sum certain.” 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a).
SER 12-13; CR 27.
The district court then ruled that the time for presenting a
negligence claim to the appropriate federal agency had long
passed:
Plaintiff’s claim therefore accrued when he was imprisoned in 1983, at which time he clearly was aware that U.S. officials had not come forward with the exculpatory evidence they allegedly promised to provide. Plaintiff had two years from that date to present his claim to the appropriate federal agency, 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b), and his failure to do so deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction.
SER 13; CR 27.
The district court also rejected Fan’s “discovery rule” argument:
The court is not persuaded that Plaintiff’s failure to timely present his negligence claim is excused under the so-called “discovery rule.” Plaintiff specifically argues that, even though he has always believed that his conviction stemmed from the failure of U.S. officials to come forward with exculpatory evidence, it was not until 2008- when his lawyer obtained “official” Chinese documents regarding his arrest- that he came to possess evidence that his conviction stemmed from the sham conversation.” Even when accepting the truth of these allegations, Plaintiff’s negligence claim is still barred because “an FTCA claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the injury and the cause of that injury, but is not deferred until the plaintiff has evidence of fault.” Lukovsky v. City &County of San Francisco, 535 F. 3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008)(emphasis added).
SER 13-14; CR 27.
Regarding Fan’s fraud claim, the district court ruled that it was subject
to dismissal not only for failure to comply with the administrative exhaustive
requirement, but also because such claims are barred by 28 U.S. C. § 2680.
SER 14; CR27. Finally, the district court ruled that any other claims ---
including any due process claim surviving dismissal of the claim for a writ of
coram nobis--- were barred by the general six-year statute of limitations for
civil claims found in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). SER 14-15; CR 27.
VII.ARGUMENT
A. The District Court Properly Dismissed the Complaint.
1. Standard of Review.
A district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
reviewed de novo Schnabel v. Lui, 302 F. 3d 1023, 1029(9th Cir. 2002).
2. The District Court Properly Dismissed the Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
Fan does not appear to challenge the dismissal of his claim for a writ
of Coram nobis. He does appear to challenge the dismissal of his negligence,
fraud and due process claims. See Appellant’s Informal Brief at Attachment 4.
Therefore, the district court’s order should be affirmed.
a. Standard for Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
A complaint must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) if, considering the factual allegations in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, the action: (1) does not arise under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States, or does not fall within one of the other
enumerated categories of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution; (2) is not
a case or controversy within the meaning of the Constitution; or (3) is not
one described by any jurisdictional statute. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
198(1962); see also 28 U.S.C.§§ 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and
1346 (United States as defendant). When considering a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the court is not restricted to the face of the
pleadings, but may review any evidence to resolve factual disputes
concerning the existence of jurisdiction. McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.
2d 558, 560(9th Cir, 1988); Biotics Research Corp. v. Heckler, 710 F. 2d
1375, 1379 (9th Cir. 1983).
A federal court is presumed to lack subject matter jurisdiction until the
plaintiff establishes otherwise. Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873
F. 2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). Therefore, the plaintiff bears the ultimate
burden of proving the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.; see also
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375,377 (1994).
Once a defendant challenges the facts underlying the jurisdictional
allegations in a complaint based on evidence outside the pleadings, the
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing, by affidavits of other evidence,
that subject matter jurisdiction does in fact exist. St. Clair v. City of Chico,
880 F. 2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989).
b. The District Court Properly Dismissed All Claims in the Complaint.
In the district court, Fan asserted entitlement to a writ of Coram
nobis. Ser 23; CR 13. Fan sought such a writ to address what he believes
was a lack of due process at his trial in China stemming from the United
States’ failure to introduce evidence of his innocence. SER 23-34; CR 13.
Fan also asserted the tort claims of negligence and fraud. SER 50-53; CR 23.
Like his due process claims, Fan’s negligence claims were based upon
allegations that the United States failed to present evidence to Chinese
authorities that the conversation with United States Consul David Hess, and
the transfer of a document were “shams” and not illegal.
The FTCA provides that an action shall not be instituted upon a claim
against the United States for money damages unless the claimant first
exhausts his administrative remedies. See 28 U.S.C. 2875(a); see also
Brady v. United States, 211 F. 3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2000). The
administrative claim requirement mandates that a plaintiff present a claim to
the appropriate federal agency within two years of the date it accrues. 28
U.S.C. 2401(b); Staple v. United States, 740 F. 2d 766, 768(9th Cir. 1984).
This exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional and must be strictly adhered to
because the FTCA waives sovereign immunity and any such waiver must be
strictly construed in favor of the United States. See Brady, 211 F. 3d at
501(citing Jerves v. United States, 966 F. 2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1992)).
When no administrative claim has been filed with the appropriate
administrative agency, a district court is without jurisdiction to hear the case,
and dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is mandated. See Brady
v. United States, 211 F. 3d 499, 502-03(9th Cir. 2000).
Here, the district court correctly found that Fan never presented an
administrative claim to any federal agency. SER 12-13; CR27. As noted by
the Court, there was nothing in the record to suggest that Fan’s letters to
various United States Presidents were “accompanied by a claim for money
damages in a sum certain” as required by 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a). SER12-13;
CR27. Also, the district court further found that the time in which to file such
a claim had passed and this was not curable. As noted by the Court, any
cause of action under the FTCA arose when he was imprisoned in 1983 and,
therefore, the applicable two-year statute of limitations 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b),
on any negligence claim expired in 1985, long before Fan filed his complaint
in 2011. SER13; CR 27. In this regard, even if the contents of Fan’s letters
to various United States Presidents could be construed as meeting the
exhaustion, it appears that the first of those letters was not sent until 2009.
See Appellant’s Informal Brief at 3.
The district court also properly rejected Fan’s “discovery rule”
argument. As noted by the Court, “an FTCA claim accrues when the plaintiff
knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the
injury and the cause of that injury, but is not deferred until the plaintiff has
evidence of fault.” Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco, 535 F. 3d
1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). SER 13-14; CR27.
Finally, as to Fan’s fraud claim, the district court noted that such a claim
connot properly be asserted against the United States. SER 14; CR27. This
was undoubtable correct as claims for misrepresentation,” i.e., fraud, are
expressly excluded from the FTCA’s scope. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h); see also
Owyhee Grazing Ass’n, Inc. v. Field, 637 F. 2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1981).
These findings and conclusions are firmly rooted in the unambiguous
language of the Federal Tort Claims Act. Therefore, Fan cannot demonstrate
that the district court erred in dismissing his negligence and fraud claims.
The district court also correctly ruled that any other claims, including
any due process claim surviving dismissal of the claim for a writ of coram
nobis, were barred by the general six-year statute of limitations for civil
claims found in 28 U.S.C.§ 2401(a). It is doubtful whether a claim sounding
in Constitutional tort can even be brought against the United States.【2】But
assuming the contrary, Fan was aware in 1983, at the time of his trial, that
the United States had not offered exculpatory evidence to the Chinese
authorities. That is the factual basis for his due process claim and, therefore,
that claim accrued in 1983. The applicable statute of limitations on any due
process claim ran in 1989. Accordingly, Fan cannot demonstrate that the
district court erred in dismissing any claims not sounding in common-law
tort.
VIII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the district court’s order granting the
United States’ Motion to Dismiss should be affirmed.
DATED this 10th day of September, 2012.
JENNY A. DURKAN
United States Attorney
Western District of Washington
s/Robert P. Brouillard
ROBERT P. BROUILLARD, WSBA #19786
Assistant United States Attorney
700 Stewart Street, Suite 5220
Seattle, Washington 98101-1271
Phone:206-553-7970
Email: Robert. Brouillard@usdoj.gov
Counsel for Defendant-Appellee
NOTE 1:“SER” refers to Appellee’s Supplemental Excerpts of Record. “CR” refers by docket number to the United States District Court Clerk’s record of the case. Appellant did not file excerpts of cord.
NOTE 2:Constitutional tort claims are not cognizable under the FTCA, FDIC v. Meyers, 510 U.S. 471, 478(1994), nor may they be brought directly against the United States in a Bivens-type action. Id. at 484-84; Cato v. United States, 70 F. 3d 1103, 1110(9th Cir. 1995). Also, while the Tucker Act allows for certain constitutional claims to be brought directly against the United States, see 28 U.S.C.§1491 (a)(1), this does not include claims sounding in Constitutional tort. See Brown v. United States, 105 F. 3d 621, 623-24 (Fed. Cir. 1997). And even if it did, since Fan seeks more than $10,000 in money damages, SER 34-35, any such claim would be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims, not he district court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2),1491(a)(1).
II.權威文件引述表 (略)
III.預先陳述和爭議摘要
在此上訴中,原告兼上訴人范似棟(後文稱「范」)尋求覆議該地區法院的裁決,該裁決同意被告美國政府的動議,駁回原告訴狀。
按照原告訴狀所述,范曾經於1982年訪問中國上海的美國領事館。 一個領事館官員告訴范,他關心領事館是否被中國人安裝了竊聽器,並要求范參與一個「假裝」的談會和假裝交給他一份中國「官方」文件,以測試他的懷疑是否正確。范不情願參加,但由於領事官員向范保證如果他被捕美國會出面幫他,所以范就不再理會這樣做中國會認為范和美國合作。范參與了「假裝」的談會,然後又假裝傳送「官方」的中國文件給領事官員。
范聲稱他很快就被捕了並被中國官方控告,罪名是向外國政府送交官方文件,1983年被判十二年入獄。范起訴時稱美國沒有向中國提交證據,以說明談話和傳交文件是假裝的和沒有違法。按照范的說法,如果美國向中國提交了這些證據,他不會被起訴,判刑和入獄。
范在訴狀中聲稱要求申請冤案補救法令。范這樣做表明他相信,由於美國沒有提供他無罪的證據,所以他在中國的判決時缺少正當合法程序。范還投訴他受到疏忽罪和欺騙罪的侵權。但是,范從來沒有遵照聯邦民事侵權賠償法(FTCA,美國法典28卷第2671節) 規定,在向法院投訴前向有關聯邦機構提起行政投訴。而且, 聯邦民事侵權賠償法(FTCA)特別禁止針對美國的欺騙指控。因此,他的侵權指控應該被地區法院駁回。
至於他的有關程序的訴求,范最終承認他的申請冤案賠償法令不適用於他的民事訴訟程序。因此,任何源於他1983年中國審判的有關法定訴訟程序的投訴,都因為六年的民事訴訟的時效(美國法典28卷第2401條(a))而被禁止,而他的投訴是2011年立案的。因此,該地區法院應該駁回他的所有指控。
IV.問題的提出
A. 地區法院是否因為缺乏事項審判權,對原告兼上訴人范似棟的投訴而給予確實駁回?
V.有關審判權的說明
這上訴針對美國華盛頓西部地區法院的終審裁定,該裁法同意批準被告美國的動議否決原告的訴求。(摘要6;文件27)【1】。根據美國法典28卷第1346節,美國地區法院對此案有審理權。
根據美國法典28卷第1291條,該地區法院對本案有審理權。該法院的終審裁定於2012年1月23日生效。2012年3月5日范在有效時間內提起上訴。(摘要1,文件30)。
VI.案件陳述
A. 范訴狀中的事實性陳述
裁定所批準同意的被告政府動議駁回了原告訴求,(摘要6-8;文件27),其中所述案件相關事實概述如下:
1982年,范訪問在中國上海的美國領事館,討論去美國留學的可能性和傳遞中國異議分子受到中國政府迫害的消息。(摘要7;文件27)。美國領事何大衛先生告訴范,他擔心領事館被中國人安裝了竊聽器,所以要求范參與一個「假裝」的談會和假裝交給他一份中國「官方」文件,以測試他的竊聽器懷疑是否正確。(摘要7;文件27)。范不情願參加,但由於領事官員向范保證如果他被捕美國會出面幫他,所以范不再理會這樣做中國會認為他和美國合作。(摘要7;文件27)。范參與了「假裝」的談會,然後又假裝傳送「官方」的中國文件給該領事官員。(摘要7;文件27)。
被告很快就被捕了並被中國官方控告,罪名是向外國政府送交官方文件,1983年被判十二年入獄,按范的說法,他被關在一個中國勞改營十二年。(摘要7;文件27)。他聲稱美國范提出訴求時稱美國沒有向中國提交證據說明談話和傳交文件是假裝的和不是非法的。按照范的說法,如果美國向中國提交了這些證據,他不會被起訴,判刑和入獄。他聲稱美國盡力營救他但卻沒有向中國提交會談和文件都是假裝的,因而不違法。(摘要7;文件27)。按范的說法, 如果美國向中國提交了這些證據,他不會被起訴,判刑和入獄。(摘要7;文件27)。
B. 范的投訴和美國政府要求駁回原告訴狀的動議
2011年范向美國華盛頓州西區地區法院起訴,尋求冤案補救法令以賠償他1983年在中國的刑事審判中因法定程序權利被侵犯而受到的損失,他還對美國的疏忽罪提出訴求。(摘要2)。2011年9月21日他第三次修改他的訴狀。(摘要3,16-36;文件13)。美國政府於10月5日提議駁回原告訴訟,基於以下理由:1)原告訴狀沒有說明有關冤案補償法令的訴求;2)由於范沒有按照聯邦民事侵權賠償法(FTCA)要求向適當的行政部門投訴所以地區法院對疏忽罪訴求沒有審理權。(摘要37-43;文件14)。
范以第四次訴狀修訂版回應政府的動議。(摘要45-57;文件23)。在他的回應中,范承認他沒有資格向法院申請冤案補償法令。(摘要45;文件23)。關於他的疏忽罪指控,范反駁說他在向法院起訴前曾就他在中國入獄一事向美國幾個總統寄過信。(摘要48;文件23)。他還爭辯說他直到2008年他才發現美國的疏忽罪,因此直到2008年,兩年時效才開始。(摘要56;文件23)。范增加了對被告的欺騙罪指控。(摘要53-56;文件23)。
2011年12月22日,美國政府對范的修改版訴狀作出回應。(摘要58;文件24)。美國政府爭辯稱范在1983年己認識到美國方面的疏忽,當時他被中國定罪,因此他的訴求應該在1983年成立,而不是根據「罪證發現原則」於2008年成立。(摘要59,文件24)。最後美國政府指出,不管怎樣,范從來沒有就疏忽罪或欺騙罪提出行政投訴,所以有關有關他所受損失的爭議沒有意義。(摘要60,文件24)。
C. 地區法院決定駁回原告訴求
2012年1月23日,地區法院批准同意美國政府有關駁回原告訴求的動議。(摘要6,文件27)。首先,該地區法院指出范承認他他沒有資格要求申請冤案補償法令,在此基礎上,駁回原告訴求中的這一要求。(摘要11,文件27)。
該地區法院也駁回范的疏忽罪指控。對此,該地區法院同意美國政府提出的范從來沒有以FTCA為目的向聯邦機構提出訴求,因此該地區法院對范的疏忽罪指控沒有管轄權。
所以即使按照原告的訴狀,相信原告曾經就他的中國入獄一事向美國總統寫過各種各樣的信,由於政府檔案裡的原告信件紀錄中沒有確定數額的賠償金要求,所以被告認為,原告從來沒有為了FTCA目的向適當的聯邦機構提出過疏忽罪訴求。(聯邦政府管理條例 28卷14.2節(a))。
(摘要12-13;文件27)。
該地區法院裁決原告向相關的聯邦機構作疏忽罪投訴的時間早已過去。
1983年,原告入獄時就已經清楚美國官員們沒有像他們所說的那樣提交為原告開脫罪責的證據,所以原告的訴求應該產生於他入獄的1983年。原告從那時開始有兩年時間向相關聯邦機構投訴。(美國法典28卷第2401節(b)款)。他的過失使得該法院無權管轄。
(摘要13,文件27)。
該地區法院也否決了范有關「罪證發現原則」的爭辯:
原告認為由於所謂的罪證發現原則,他的沒有及時提交疏忽罪的投訴可以被輍免,該但地區法院並不認同。原告特別爭辯說,既使他一直相信他的入獄是由於美國官員沒有提交為他開脫罪責的證據,直到2008年他的律師得到了有關他被捕的中國官方文件,他才掌握證據,證據表明他的定罪是因為那次和美國領事的「假裝」的談話。即使接受原告的說法,原告的疏忽罪指控仍然被拒絕,因為「一個FTCA訴求的成立,在於原告知道傷害的時候,或者一個通情達理的勤勉的人應該知道傷害和傷害的原因的時候,而不是拿到事故的證據的時候。(羅克斯可夫對舊金山市和縣,聯邦法律報告三系列535卷,1044,1050頁(第九上訴法院208年))(重點號已加)。
(摘要13-14,文件27)。
關於范提出的欺騙罪指控,該地區法院裁決認定,這項指控被否決,不僅因為這項指控沒有遵守行政部門的規定,而且也因為這項指控被美國法典28卷2680節所禁止。(摘要14,文件27)。最後,該地區法院裁決原告的其它指控訴求,包括法定程序權利被侵犯的指控訴求,以及已經被否決的申請冤案補償法令,都因美國法典28卷2401節(a)款所規定的民事訴訟的通常的六年時效的原因而被禁止。(摘要14-15, 文件27)。
VII.爭議
A. 該地區法院正確地駁回了原告訴訟
1. 基本回顧
根據聯邦關於民事訴訟程序的規定,重新回顧該地區法院由於缺乏事項管轄權而作出的駁回決定。(斯克諾伯兒 對 劉 聯邦法律報告 第三系列302卷1023,1029頁)(第九上訴法院2002年)。
2. 由於缺乏事項管轄權地區法院正確地駁回了原告訴訟
范沒有對他的申請冤案補償法令被否決表示異議。他對他的疏忽罪,欺騙罪和法定訴訟程序的訴求被駁回表示反對。參見上訴人非正式文件附加4部分,因此必須對該地區法院的裁決加以重申。
a. 由於缺乏事項管轄權而作出駁回決定的標準
按照聯邦關於民事訴訟程序第12條(b)(1)的規定,如果一個訴訟符合以下條件,則必須被駁回。考慮到原告的事實性陳述往往對原告有利,如果起訴:1.沒有憲法,法律和美國簽定的條約為根據,或者不屬於憲法第三章第二條的類似範圍;2.不是在憲法意義上的案件和爭議;3.不是在司法管轄權範圍內的問題。(貝克 對 卡,美國案例和準則,369卷186,198節, 也參見美國法典28卷1331頁)(聯邦問題初審權)和1346款,(作為被告的美國政府)。根據聯邦民事程序條例12條(b)(1),考慮一個動議是否否決時,法院不必受原告訴狀的限制,而應該考慮多方證據以解決有關管轄權的事實性爭議。(麦卡錫 對 美國, 聯邦案例報告 第二系列850卷558,560頁(第九上訴法院,1988年);生命學研究公司 對 赫克爾 聯邦案例報告第二系列710卷1375,1379(第九上訴法院,1983年))。
在原告證明聯邦法院有事項管轄權之前,可以假定聯邦法院缺乏事項管轄權。(西方股票公司 對 聯合部落 聯邦案例報告第二系列873卷,1221,1225頁(第9上訴法院,1989年))。因此原告承擔證明事項管轄權存在的最終責任。參見考克任 對 美國保護生命有限公司 美國案例和準則 511卷 375,377頁(1994))。當被告根據訴狀以外的證據對訴狀中有關管轄權的事實進行挑戰時,原告有責任證明事項管轄權,提供證據證書,這樣事項管轄權才切實存在。(聖克萊 對 切可市, 聯邦案例報告第二系列880卷199,201頁(第9上訴法院,1989年))。
b. 地區法院正確地否決了訴狀中的所有指控
在地區法院,范聲稱尋求申請冤案補償法令。(摘要23,文件13)。范這樣尋求這個法令是為了解決他所認為的由於美國沒有提供證據證明他的清白,使他在中國的審理沒有經過正當的法定程序。(摘要23-34;文件13)。范也聲稱美國政府的疏忽罪和欺騙罪造成了對他的侵權損害。(摘要50-53,文件23)。像他的法定程序權利受到侵犯一樣,范的疏忽罪指控也是源於美國政府沒有向中國政府提供證據,以證明美國領事何大衛的談話和傳交文件都是假裝的和沒有違犯法律。
除非投訴人事先爭取行政部門的賠償,還是沒有辦法解決,聯邦侵權賠償法才可以立案和提供美國國家賠償。(美國法典28卷 2875節(a),並參見 伯萊迪 訴 美國, 美國案例報告第三系列211卷499,502頁(第9上訴法院,2000年))。行政投訴要求原告在訴求成立的兩年內, 向相關聯邦機構提出訴求。(美國法典28卷2401節 (b) 款; 斯泰柏爾 訴 美國, 聯邦案例報告第二系列740卷766,768頁(第9上訴法院1984年))。這一有問題行政部門解決,輕易不使用聯邦民事侵權賠償法(FTCA)的要求關係到司法管轄權,必須堅決照辦,因為聯邦民事侵權賠償法放棄國家主權輍免權,由於這樣的放棄所以必須在其它方面盡可能照顧美國的利益。參見柏萊迪, 聯邦案例報告第三系列211卷501頁 (引自傑弗斯 訴 美國, 聯邦案例報告第二系列966卷517,521頁(第9上訴法院.1992年))。所以如果沒有向相關行政機構作行政投訴,地區法院沒有審理案件的管轄權,所以由於沒有管轄權駁回訴訟是必然的。參見 柏萊迪 訴 美國, 聯邦案例報告第三系列211卷499,502~503頁()第9上訴法院.2000年)。
這裡,該地區法院正確地發現范從來沒有向任何聯邦機構作行政投訴。(摘要12-13;文件27)。正如法院著重提出的,沒有紀錄表明范像聯邦注冊委員會28卷14.2節(a)款所要求的給各位總統的信件附有具體金額的賠償金。(摘要12-13;文件27)。而且該地區法院還進一步發現行政投訴早已過了而且無法補救。正如該法院著重指出的,原告在1983年入獄,因此在兩年的有效期內,原告可以提出聯邦民事侵權名義的任何訴訟。(美國法典28卷2401節 (b))。作為疏忽罪指控的限期是1985年,和范投訴的2011年相比早很多年。(摘要13;文件27)。就這一點而言, 即使范給各位總統的信件滿足了聯邦民事侵權賠償法(FTCA)竭盡全力的條件,看來這些信件中的第一封是2009年才發出的。參見上訴人的非正式文件第三份文件。
該地區法院也正確地否決了范的「罪證發現原則」的爭議。正像該法院指出的那樣,「一個聯邦民事侵權賠償法(FTCA)訴求的成立,在於原告知道傷害的時候,或者一個通情達理的勤勉的人應該知道傷害和傷害的原因的時候,而不是拿到事故的證據的時候。(羅克斯可夫 訴 舊金山市和縣,聯邦案例報告第三系列535卷,1044,1050頁(第9上訴法院208年))(重點號已加)。(摘要13-14;文件27)。最後,是關於范的欺騙罪指控,該地區法院指出,這個對美國的指控不合適。(摘要14;文件27)。無疑范的這一指控是因為歪曲誤傳。比如,在聯邦民事侵權賠償法中特別排除欺騙罪。(美國法典28卷2680節(h));也參見奧維希牧場協會公司 訴 費爾德, 聯邦案例報告第二系列694,697頁(第9上訴法院,1981年)。
這些文字和結論毫不含糊地寫在聯邦民事侵權法中。因此范不能證明該地區法院把他的疏忽罪和欺騙罪指控駁回有什麼錯。
該地區法院也正確地裁決范其它的訴求,包括任何申請冤案補救法令的法定程序權利被侵犯的訴求,被美國法典28卷2401(a)民事訴訟法6年時效所禁止。值得懷疑的是一個憲法意義上的侵權行為是否可以構成對美國的訴訟。【2】我們假設,范在他被審判的1983年已經意識到美國沒有向中國提供他的無罪證明。這是他的合法程序權利被侵犯的訴求的事實基礎。因此,訴求於1983年成立。所以可行的合法的程序時效算至1989年。范無法證明該地區法院駁回他的訴求有什麼錯,這些訴求聽起來不像習慣法的侵權行為。
VIII. CONCLUSION 結論
根據以上說明的理由,該地局法院同意美國的動議駁回原告訴求必須得到肯定。
日期2012年9月10日。
吉妮 A. 德坎
美國律師
華盛頓州西部地區
注解1.「摘要(SER)」即被告補充和摘要的紀錄。「文件(CR)」即美國地區法院案件紀錄編號。原告檔案沒有在摘要中存放。
注解2.憲法意義的對侵權行為的訴訟不是聯邦民事侵權賠償法可以審理的。傅迪克 訴 迈爾斯, 美國最高法院案例 510卷471,478頁(1994年)),也不可直接以畢文案的方式對美國起訴。(卡妥 訴 美國 聯邦案例報告三集70卷1103,1110頁(第9上訴法院 1995年))。還有,雖然特克爾法令允許一定的憲法訴訟可以直接針對美國,參見美國法典28卷1491(a)(1)。但這不包括憲法意義的侵權行為訴訟。參見布朗 訴 美國 聯邦案例報告第三系列105卷621,623-24頁(聯邦上訴法院1997年)。即使這些問題都不存,由於范尋求超過1萬美金的賠償金,(摘要34-35),這樣的訴求必須由特殊管轄權的聯邦賠償法院審理,而不是由地區法院。(參見美國法典28卷1346節(a)(2),1491節(a)(1))。
ANSWERING BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
I.TABLE OF CONTENTS (OMITTED)
II.TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (OMITTED)
III.PRELIMINARY STATEMENT AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In this appeal, Plaintiff-Appellant Stone Dong Fan (“Fan”) seeks review of the district court’s order granting the government’s motion to dismiss.
According to his complaint, Fan visited the United States Consulate in Shanghai, China, in 1982. Fan was told by a consular official that he was concerned that the consulate was “bugged” by the Chinese and asked Fan to engage in a “sham” conversation, and pretend to pass him an “official” Chinese document, to test whether his bugging suspicion was correct. Fan reluctantly agreed to participate, despite concerns that the Chinese would think he was really cooperating with the United States, because the consular official assured him that the United States would come to his assistance if he was arrested. Fan engaged in the “sham” conversation and pretended to pass an “official” Chinese document to the consular official.
Fan alleges that he was promptly arrested by Chinese authorities charged with the crime of passing an official document to a foreign government, and upon conviction in 1983 was imprisoned for 12 years. Fan claims that the United States never presented the Chinese with evidence that the conversation and transfer of the document were shams and not illegal. According to Fan, had the United States presented such evidence to the Chinese, he would not have been prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned.
Fan’s complaint asserted entitlement to writ of Coram Nobis. Fan sought such a writ to address what he believes was a lack of due process at his trial in China, stemming from the United States’ failure to introduce evidence of his innocence. Fan also asserted tort claims of negligence and fraud. However, Fan never presented an administrative claim to the appropriate federal agency prior to filing suit, as required by the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C §2671, et seq. (“FTCA”). Furthermore, the FTCA specifically forbids claims for fraud against the United States. Therefore, his tort claims were properly dismissed by the district court.
As for his due process claim, Fan eventually conceded that a writ of Coram Nobis was not available to him in this civil proceeding. Furthermore, any due process claim stemming from his trial in China arose in 1983 and, therefore, was barred at the time the action below was filed in 2011 by the general six-year statute of limitations for civil claims found in 28 U.S.C. §2401(a). Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed all of the claims before it.
IV.ISSUE PRESENTED
A Did the district court properly dismiss the complaint where it clearly lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of all claims stated therein by Plaintiff-Appellant Stone Dong Fan?
V.STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final order issued by the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granting the United States’ Motion to Dismiss. Ser6; CR 27.【1】The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1346.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291. The district court’s order was entered on January 23, 2012. SER3. On March 5, 2012 Fan timely appealed. SER 1; CR 30.
VI.STATEMNET OF THE CASE
A. The Factual Allegations of Fan’s Complaint.
The relevant factual allegations, which are set forth in the Order granting the government’s motion to dismiss, SER 6-8; CR27, can be summarized as follows:
In 1982, Fan visited the United States Consulate in Shanghai, China, to discuss the possibility of studying in the United States and to relay information to United States officials regarding the suppression of dissent by the Chinese government. SER 7; CR 27. The United States Consul, David Hess, told Fan that he was concerned that the consulate was “bugged” by the Chinese and asked Fan to engage in a “sham” conversation, and pretended to pass him an “official” Chinese document, to test whether his bugging suspicion was correct. SER 7; CR 27. Fan reluctantly agreed to participate, despite concerns that the Chinese would think he was really cooperating with the United States, after Hess assured his that the United States would come to his assistance if he was arrested. SER 7; CR 27. Thereafter, Fan engaged in the “sham” conversation with Hess and pretended to pass an “official” Chinese document to him. SER 7; CR 27.
Plaintiff was promptly arrested by Chinese authorities and charged with the crime of passing an official document to a foreign government. SER 7; CR27. He was convicted in 1983 and , according to Fan, was imprisoned for 12 years in a Chinese labor camp. SER 7; CR 27. He claims that the United States did its best to try and rescue him but that the United States never presented the Chinese with evidence that the conversation and transfer of the document were shams and not illegal. SER 7; CR 27. According to Fan, had the United States presented such evidence to the Chinese, he would not have been prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned. SER 7; CR 27.
B. Fan’s complaint and the Government’s Motion to Dismiss.
In 2011, Fan filed a complaint in United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, seeking a writ of Coram nobis to remedy alleged procedural due process violations that occurred in his Chinese criminal trial in 1983, and also alleging negligent inaction on the part of the United States. SER 2. He amended his complaint for the third time on September 21, 2011. SER 3, 16-36; CR 13. The government moved to dismiss the complaint on October 5, 2011, on the grounds that: 1) the complaint failed to state a claim for a writ of Coram nobis; and 2)the district court lacked jurisdiction over the negligence claims because Fan had failed to file an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency before filing suit as required by the FTCA. SER 37-43; CR 14.
Fan responded to the government’s motion with what was essentially a fourth amended complaint. SER45-57; CR 23. In his response, Fan conceded that he was not entitled to a writ of Coram nobis. SER 45; CR 23. In regards to his negligence claims, Fan countered that he had mailed various letters to various United States Presidents prior to filing suit concerning his imprisonment by the Chinese. SER 48; CR 23. He also argued that it was not until 2008 that he discovered the United States’ negligence and that his claims, therefore, did not accrue until 2008 for purposes f the applicable two-year stature of limitations. SER 56; CR23. Fan also added a claim of fraud to his original claims. SER 53-56; CR23.
The government filed a reply to Fan’s response/amended complaint on December 22,2011. SER58; CR 24. The government argued Fan was aware of any negligence on the part of the United States in 1983 when he was convicted by the Chinese government, and his claims therefore accrued in 1983, not in 2008 under the so-called “discovery rule.” SER 59; CR 24. Finally, the government noted that, regardless of tolling, Fan had never filed an administrative claim with respect to negligence or fraud and, therefore, the tolling argument was not relevant. SER 60; CR 24.
C. The District Court’s Decision Dismissing the Complaint.
On January 23, 2012, the district court granted the government’ motion to dismiss. SER 6; CR 27. First, the district noted that Fan had conceded that he was not entitled to a writ of Coram Nobis and, based upon that concession, dismissed the claim for such relief. SER 11; CR27.
The district court also dismissed Fan’s negligence claims. In doing so, the
district court agreed with the government that Fan had never presented a
claim to a federal agency for purposes of the FTCA and that the district
court, therefore, lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Fan’s negligence
claims:
As such, even when crediting Plaintiff’s claim that he sent various letters to the President regarding his Chinese imprisonment, Plaintiff’s claim of negligence was never “presented to an appropriate federal agency for purposes of the FTCA since there is nothing in the record of suggest that those letters were “accompanied by a claim for money damages in a sum certain.” 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a).
SER 12-13; CR 27.
The district court then ruled that the time for presenting a
negligence claim to the appropriate federal agency had long
passed:
Plaintiff’s claim therefore accrued when he was imprisoned in 1983, at which time he clearly was aware that U.S. officials had not come forward with the exculpatory evidence they allegedly promised to provide. Plaintiff had two years from that date to present his claim to the appropriate federal agency, 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b), and his failure to do so deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction.
SER 13; CR 27.
The district court also rejected Fan’s “discovery rule” argument:
The court is not persuaded that Plaintiff’s failure to timely present his negligence claim is excused under the so-called “discovery rule.” Plaintiff specifically argues that, even though he has always believed that his conviction stemmed from the failure of U.S. officials to come forward with exculpatory evidence, it was not until 2008- when his lawyer obtained “official” Chinese documents regarding his arrest- that he came to possess evidence that his conviction stemmed from the sham conversation.” Even when accepting the truth of these allegations, Plaintiff’s negligence claim is still barred because “an FTCA claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the injury and the cause of that injury, but is not deferred until the plaintiff has evidence of fault.” Lukovsky v. City &County of San Francisco, 535 F. 3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008)(emphasis added).
SER 13-14; CR 27.
Regarding Fan’s fraud claim, the district court ruled that it was subject
to dismissal not only for failure to comply with the administrative exhaustive
requirement, but also because such claims are barred by 28 U.S. C. § 2680.
SER 14; CR27. Finally, the district court ruled that any other claims ---
including any due process claim surviving dismissal of the claim for a writ of
coram nobis--- were barred by the general six-year statute of limitations for
civil claims found in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). SER 14-15; CR 27.
VII.ARGUMENT
A. The District Court Properly Dismissed the Complaint.
1. Standard of Review.
A district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
reviewed de novo Schnabel v. Lui, 302 F. 3d 1023, 1029(9th Cir. 2002).
2. The District Court Properly Dismissed the Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
Fan does not appear to challenge the dismissal of his claim for a writ
of Coram nobis. He does appear to challenge the dismissal of his negligence,
fraud and due process claims. See Appellant’s Informal Brief at Attachment 4.
Therefore, the district court’s order should be affirmed.
a. Standard for Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
A complaint must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) if, considering the factual allegations in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, the action: (1) does not arise under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States, or does not fall within one of the other
enumerated categories of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution; (2) is not
a case or controversy within the meaning of the Constitution; or (3) is not
one described by any jurisdictional statute. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
198(1962); see also 28 U.S.C.§§ 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and
1346 (United States as defendant). When considering a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the court is not restricted to the face of the
pleadings, but may review any evidence to resolve factual disputes
concerning the existence of jurisdiction. McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.
2d 558, 560(9th Cir, 1988); Biotics Research Corp. v. Heckler, 710 F. 2d
1375, 1379 (9th Cir. 1983).
A federal court is presumed to lack subject matter jurisdiction until the
plaintiff establishes otherwise. Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873
F. 2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). Therefore, the plaintiff bears the ultimate
burden of proving the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.; see also
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375,377 (1994).
Once a defendant challenges the facts underlying the jurisdictional
allegations in a complaint based on evidence outside the pleadings, the
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing, by affidavits of other evidence,
that subject matter jurisdiction does in fact exist. St. Clair v. City of Chico,
880 F. 2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989).
b. The District Court Properly Dismissed All Claims in the Complaint.
In the district court, Fan asserted entitlement to a writ of Coram
nobis. Ser 23; CR 13. Fan sought such a writ to address what he believes
was a lack of due process at his trial in China stemming from the United
States’ failure to introduce evidence of his innocence. SER 23-34; CR 13.
Fan also asserted the tort claims of negligence and fraud. SER 50-53; CR 23.
Like his due process claims, Fan’s negligence claims were based upon
allegations that the United States failed to present evidence to Chinese
authorities that the conversation with United States Consul David Hess, and
the transfer of a document were “shams” and not illegal.
The FTCA provides that an action shall not be instituted upon a claim
against the United States for money damages unless the claimant first
exhausts his administrative remedies. See 28 U.S.C. 2875(a); see also
Brady v. United States, 211 F. 3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2000). The
administrative claim requirement mandates that a plaintiff present a claim to
the appropriate federal agency within two years of the date it accrues. 28
U.S.C. 2401(b); Staple v. United States, 740 F. 2d 766, 768(9th Cir. 1984).
This exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional and must be strictly adhered to
because the FTCA waives sovereign immunity and any such waiver must be
strictly construed in favor of the United States. See Brady, 211 F. 3d at
501(citing Jerves v. United States, 966 F. 2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1992)).
When no administrative claim has been filed with the appropriate
administrative agency, a district court is without jurisdiction to hear the case,
and dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is mandated. See Brady
v. United States, 211 F. 3d 499, 502-03(9th Cir. 2000).
Here, the district court correctly found that Fan never presented an
administrative claim to any federal agency. SER 12-13; CR27. As noted by
the Court, there was nothing in the record to suggest that Fan’s letters to
various United States Presidents were “accompanied by a claim for money
damages in a sum certain” as required by 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a). SER12-13;
CR27. Also, the district court further found that the time in which to file such
a claim had passed and this was not curable. As noted by the Court, any
cause of action under the FTCA arose when he was imprisoned in 1983 and,
therefore, the applicable two-year statute of limitations 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b),
on any negligence claim expired in 1985, long before Fan filed his complaint
in 2011. SER13; CR 27. In this regard, even if the contents of Fan’s letters
to various United States Presidents could be construed as meeting the
exhaustion, it appears that the first of those letters was not sent until 2009.
See Appellant’s Informal Brief at 3.
The district court also properly rejected Fan’s “discovery rule”
argument. As noted by the Court, “an FTCA claim accrues when the plaintiff
knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the
injury and the cause of that injury, but is not deferred until the plaintiff has
evidence of fault.” Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco, 535 F. 3d
1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). SER 13-14; CR27.
Finally, as to Fan’s fraud claim, the district court noted that such a claim
connot properly be asserted against the United States. SER 14; CR27. This
was undoubtable correct as claims for misrepresentation,” i.e., fraud, are
expressly excluded from the FTCA’s scope. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h); see also
Owyhee Grazing Ass’n, Inc. v. Field, 637 F. 2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1981).
These findings and conclusions are firmly rooted in the unambiguous
language of the Federal Tort Claims Act. Therefore, Fan cannot demonstrate
that the district court erred in dismissing his negligence and fraud claims.
The district court also correctly ruled that any other claims, including
any due process claim surviving dismissal of the claim for a writ of coram
nobis, were barred by the general six-year statute of limitations for civil
claims found in 28 U.S.C.§ 2401(a). It is doubtful whether a claim sounding
in Constitutional tort can even be brought against the United States.【2】But
assuming the contrary, Fan was aware in 1983, at the time of his trial, that
the United States had not offered exculpatory evidence to the Chinese
authorities. That is the factual basis for his due process claim and, therefore,
that claim accrued in 1983. The applicable statute of limitations on any due
process claim ran in 1989. Accordingly, Fan cannot demonstrate that the
district court erred in dismissing any claims not sounding in common-law
tort.
VIII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the district court’s order granting the
United States’ Motion to Dismiss should be affirmed.
DATED this 10th day of September, 2012.
JENNY A. DURKAN
United States Attorney
Western District of Washington
s/Robert P. Brouillard
ROBERT P. BROUILLARD, WSBA #19786
Assistant United States Attorney
700 Stewart Street, Suite 5220
Seattle, Washington 98101-1271
Phone:206-553-7970
Email: Robert. Brouillard@usdoj.gov
Counsel for Defendant-Appellee
NOTE 1:“SER” refers to Appellee’s Supplemental Excerpts of Record. “CR” refers by docket number to the United States District Court Clerk’s record of the case. Appellant did not file excerpts of cord.
NOTE 2:Constitutional tort claims are not cognizable under the FTCA, FDIC v. Meyers, 510 U.S. 471, 478(1994), nor may they be brought directly against the United States in a Bivens-type action. Id. at 484-84; Cato v. United States, 70 F. 3d 1103, 1110(9th Cir. 1995). Also, while the Tucker Act allows for certain constitutional claims to be brought directly against the United States, see 28 U.S.C.§1491 (a)(1), this does not include claims sounding in Constitutional tort. See Brown v. United States, 105 F. 3d 621, 623-24 (Fed. Cir. 1997). And even if it did, since Fan seeks more than $10,000 in money damages, SER 34-35, any such claim would be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims, not he district court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2),1491(a)(1).
